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Draining the Flooded Markets: Tariffs,
Suniva & Solar Energy Investment
MICHAEL A. STROUP*
ABSTRACT
Demand for solar energy in the United States has increased
significantly over the past half century. Despite the falling costs of solar
infrastructure, the United States solar energy market is at a turning
point. In 2017, two insolvent U.S. solar manufacturers, Suniva and
SolarWorld America, successfully petitioned the International Trade
Commission (ITC) to invoke Section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act. The two
U.S. manufacturers argued that a surplus of imported Chinese solar
panels has driven the cost of solar infrastructure too low and forced
them out of the market. The ITC responded by recommending tariffs on
global solar photovoltaic (PV) panel imports, which were then
implemented by President Trump in early 2018. This note addresses the
negative effects that PV import tariffs have on investment in the U.S.
solar energy market, posits that a free-market approach toward PV
panel trade will maximize investment in solar energy, and explains that
imposing tariffs on PV panel imports leads to more net harm than good.
INTRODUCTION
The generating capacity of renewable energy in the United States
has grown at an astronomical rate since the beginning of the twenty-
first century.1 While the term renewable encompasses a myriad of
* Notes Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 26; J.D. Candidate, 2019,
Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., Economics, 2016, Eastern
Michigan University-Ypsilanti. Many thanks to the Alternative Investment Division of
Kyobo AXA Investment Managers Co., Ltd. for fueling my research in solar investments.
1. See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, DOE/EIA-0035 (2017/10),
MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW OCTOBER 2017, at 109 (2017).
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energy sources, such as hydropower, biomass, and geothermal, 2 the
recent growth has come almost exclusively from wind- and solar-
powered energy. 3 Solar energy alone has grown in the United States
from generating 493 million kilowatt-hours in 2000 to 36.75 billion
kilowatt-hours in 20164, a growth rate of over 7,000 percent.
The enormous growth in solar energy has mainly been driven by the
declining production costs of photovoltaic (PV) panels worldwide. PV is
defined as the conversion of light into electricity. 5 PV panels employ an
array of individual PV cells that are made of a semiconductor material,
most commonly silicon.6 When the energy from sunlight hits the PV
cells, electricity is produced at the atomic level, which is then captured
and redirected.7 This paper will not address concentrated thermal solar
energy-a similar technology that converts sunlight into heat rather
than electricity. Concentrated thermal solar energy is predominantly
used for large-scale energy production by powering steam turbines. 8
The global cost of producing energy from PV panels is nearly one-
quarter of what it was eight years ago9 and is projected to drop an
additional 66 percent by 2040.10 Increased cost efficiency and
installation rates leads to an influx of private and public investment
into solar energy, which in turn drives production costs down further. In
2015 alone, $30.2 billion were invested in the U.S. solar energy
market. "
Through growing investments, the United States is attempting to
bring solar energy onto the same playing field as fossil fuel energy
sources. The investment outlook shifted, however, when Suniva, a U.S.
PV panel manufacturer, filed for bankruptcy on April 17, 2017.12 Suniva
was unable to compete with the declining PV costs driven by Asian
2. Id. at 230.
3. See id. at 109.
4. See id.
5. Gil Knier, How do Photovoltaics Work?, NASA (Aug. 6, 2008), https://science.
nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2002/solarcells.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. How Does Solar Work?, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS'N,
https://www.seia.org/initiatives/how-does-solar-work (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
9. Jess Shankleman & Hayley Warren, Solar Power Will Kill Coal Faster than You
Think, BLOOMBERG (June 15, 2017, 7:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2017-06- 15/solar-power-will-kill-coal-sooner-than-you-think.
10. BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, NEW ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017, at 2 (2017).
11. See U.N. ENVT PROGRAMME & BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, GLOBAL
TRENDS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 2016, at 24 (2016).
12. Christian Roselund, Suniva Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, PV MAG. (Apr. 18,
2017), https://www.pv-magazine.com/2017/04/18/suniva-files-for-bankruptcy/.
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manufacturers, "which have flooded the U.S. with cheap panels." 13
Instead of accepting defeat, Suniva successfully petitioned the
International Trade Commission (ITC) to invoke Section 201 of the 1974
Trade Act that "allows for temporary relief in situations where surging
imports are causing 'serious injury' to a U.S. industry." 14 SolarWorld
America, a subsidiary of the German PV manufacturer, became a co-
petitioner weeks later when news broke of the company's insolvency.15
After conducting an investigation, the ITC determined that a serious
injury existed 16 and later recommended remedies including tariffs up to
35 percent and various annual quota caps on imported PV materials. 17
In January 2018, President Trump opted to impose a four-year tariff
schedule on all imported PV cells and panels, ranging from 30 percent
in year one to 15 percent in year four. 18
This note addresses the negative effects that PV import tariffs have
on investment in the U.S. solar energy market, posits that a free-market
approach toward PV panel trade will maximize investment in solar
energy, and explains that imposing tariffs on PV panel imports leads to
more net harm than good. Part I examines the history of investment in
solar energy and explores the market expansion in recent decades. Part
II assesses the relationship between tariffs and investment through a
case study involving tariffs placed on Chinese PV imports in 2012 and
2014. Part III looks at the Suniva Section 201 case and weighs the
reasons given in favor of tariffs on Asian PV imports against the effects
on investment in the U.S. solar energy market through a fundamental
economics lens.
13. Joe Ryan & Jennifer A Dlouhy, This Case Could Upend America's $29 Billion Solar
Industry, BLOOMBERG (June 15, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-
15/this-case-could-upend-america-s-29-billion-solar-industry.
14. Solar Section 201 Case - Frequently Asked Questions, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES
ASSOCIATION, https://www.seia.org/initiatives/solar-section-201-case-frequently-asked-
questions (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
15. See Joe Ryan, SolarWorld Joins Case Seeking U.S. Duties on Cheap Solar Imports,
BLOOMBERG (last updated May 26, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2017-05-25/solarworld-americas-j oins-suniva-trade-case-for-import-duties.
16. Lacey Johnson & Julia Pyper, Solar Tariff Case Advances as ITC Finds 'Injury',
GREENTECH MEDIA (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/solar-
trade-case-advances-as-ite-finds-injury.
17. See Julia Pyper, ITC Issues Recommended Remedies in Section 201 Solar Trade
Case, GREENTECH MEDIA (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles
/read/itc-solar-trade-case-recommendations.
18. Timothy Cama, Trump Imposes 30 Percent Tariff on Solar Panel Imports, THE HILL
(Jan. 22, 2018, 4:57 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/370171-trump-
imposes-30-tariffs-on-solar-panel-imports.
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RISE OF GLOBAL SOLAR INVESTMENT
Early Growth
The first use of solar PV technology came in 1958 when it was used
to power the radio system on the Vanguard I space satellite.19 The
technology at that point, however, was nothing more than a luxury,
considering the capital costs. Even a mere forty years ago, solar energy
production on a mass-scale was unheard of. MITs workshop on
Alternative Energy Strategies reported in 1977 that "[e]ach year the
world's solar energy income at ground level is about ... 1,000 times the
energy of the known reserves of oil but efficient extraction of this
abundant resource is difficult."20 Technology and cost-effectiveness
simply was not present, but solar energy was not ruled out as a
dominant force to come in the following decades. The same report
added, "after the year 2000, solar can be expected to play an
increasingly important role in the energy mix."21
In hopes that solar energy would eventually play a prominent role
in the not-too-distant future, a myriad of public and private investors
began to pump large investments into the industry. It is said that the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) invested nearly
$1 billion in solar energy research and development (R&D) between
1950 and 2006.22 Despite serious hurdles preventing solar energy
growth by Washington conservatives and the fossil fuel industries in the
1980s, investment in the solar market continued to grow domestically
and globally throughout the late twentieth century. 23
Private Investment Explosion
At the turn of the century, investment in solar energy began to
take off. The average cost of PV cells in 2000 was well below ten dollars
19. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE
ENERGY, THE HISTORY OF SOLAR 4 (last visited Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www 1.eere.energy.gov/solar/pdfs/solar timeline.pdf.
20. WORKSHOP ON ALTERNATIVE ENERGY STRATEGIES, ENERGY: GLOBAL PROSPECTS
1985-2000, at 223 (1977).
21. Id. at 224.
22. NANCY PFUND & BEN HEALEY, WHAT WOULD JEFFERSON Do? THE HISTORICAL
ROLE OF FEDERAL SUBSIDIES IN SHAPING AMERICA'S ENERGY FUTURE 18 (2011),
http://www.dblpartners.vc/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/What-Would-Jefferson-Do-
2.4.pdP597435&43c889
23. See Arthur Allen, Prodigal Sun, MOTHER JONES, Mar./Apr. 2000,
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2000/03/prodigal-sun/.
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per watt as compared to over seventy-six dollars per watt in 1977.24
Private investors saw the market was expanding through decreases in
capital costs and realized the opportunity to make a profit. Global
private capital investments in solar energy proceeded to grow from $66
million in 2000 to $417 million in 2003.25 Growth continued to expand
exponentially to $2.5 billion in 2005, $7.1 billion in 2006, and $12.4
billion in 2007.26 In the United States, public investment as a
percentage of total investment shrank from an average of 50 percent
between 2000 and 2004 to less than 4 percent in 2007, as private
investment began to pour in. 27
Between 2004 and 2007, global private equity dollars in the
industry grew at an average annual rate of almost 300 percent to a sum
of over $1.2 billion in 2007.28 Venture capital also saw massive
expansions, albeit more steady than private equity, and averaged
annual growth at about 116 percent between 2004 and 2007.29
Not only is it important to see how much private investment has
grown, but it is also equally important to see where it has gone
throughout the world. In 2007, 57 percent of global private equity
investment went to the European Union (EU), and a staggering 82
percent of global venture capital dollars went to the United States. 30
This data paints a picture of the underlying regional policies. In the EU,
several governments have been forthright and generous in subsidizing
their nations' solar industries that in turn increases demand and
attracts investment dollars to the expansion of existing infrastructure
rather than emerging technology. 31 In the United States-where public
subsidies have been significantly smaller-private investment is more
geared toward technology advancement, which attracts venture
capitalists to the potential of future expansion.
While the global financial markets were in disarray following the
collapse of the U.S. housing bubble in 2007 and 2008, the effects on the
solar market were much smaller since private equity and venture
24. See Zachary Shahan, 13 Charts on Solar Panel Cost & Growth Trends,
CLEANTECHNICA (Sept. 4, 2014), https://cleantechnica.com/2014/09/04/solar-panel-cost-
trends- 10-charts/.
25. CHARLES E. JENNINGS ET AL., NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, A
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT IN SOLAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES (2000-2007), at 6
(2008).
26. Id.
27. See id. at 8.
28. See id. at 11.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 13.
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capital tend to be "more insulated from financial shocks." 32 Surprisingly,
global capacity for solar PV energy saw its strongest growth between
2008 and 2011 at an average annual rate of 75.25 percent. 33 Despite a
temporary global shortage of silicon-the main ingredient for PV cells-
costs of solar PV production continued to fall, 34 and solar energy played
an increasingly prominent role in the aftermath of the crisis.
The solar industry continued its global expansion throughout the
2010s as global regions outside of the United States, Europe, and Asia
began utilizing solar energy on a large scale. 35 In the United States,
total investment in solar energy had grown to $29.3 billion in 201636
and contributed to the addition of over 115,000 domestic solar jobs
between 2010 and 2015. 37 However, venture capital and private equity
investments in the U.S. solar market have dropped in recent years, 38
perhaps showing that the domestic market is maturing as the European
Union's market did a decade ago. As of 2016, the United States was
ranked fifth in a list of countries that generate the greatest amount of
solar energy. 39 Germany was the global leader with more than double
the generating capacity of the United States, and China and Japan took
second and third, respectively.4 0
Bloomberg New Energy Finance projects that $2.8 trillion will be
invested in global solar energy by 2040.41 Additionally, research
suggests that returns on renewable investments could reach an average
of 10. 1 percent over the next thirty-five years,4 2 but that is highly
dependent on government policies: policies that can give a huge boost to
32. JOHN E. BARTLETT ET AL., NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, THE
EFFECTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON PHOTOVOLTAICS: AN ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN
MARKET FORECASTS FROM 2008 TO 2009, at 2 (2009).
33. See OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, 2015 RENEWABLE
ENERGY DATA BOOK 44 (2016).
34. See Leo Lewis, Silicon Shortage Hits Solar Power Hopes, THE FINANCIAL TIMES
(Nov. 20, 2006), https://www.ft.com/content/e50784ea-78cb-lldb-8743-0000779e2340
(describing the silicon shortage and its effects); See also Shahan, supra note 24
(illustrating the long-term pricing trends of solar PV technology).
35. See KPMG, GLOBAL TRENDS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY 9 (2016).
36. U.N. ENV T PROGRAMME & BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, GLOBAL TRENDS IN
RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 2017, at 24 (2017).
37. THE SOLAR FOUNDATION, NATIONAL SOLAR JOBS CENSUS 2015, at 5 (2016).
38. See Ucilia Wang, The Ups and Downs of U.S. Solar Inestments, FORBES (July 13,
2015, 5:42 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2015/07/13/report-the-ups-and-
downs-of-u-s-solar-investments/#6346f3647df0.
39. Rebecca Harrington, These 10 Countries are Leading the World in Solar Energy,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 15, 2016, 4:35 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/best-solar-
power-countries-2016-3/#6-france-5678-megawatts-5.
40. See id.
41. BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, supra note 10, at 2.
42. MERCER, INVESTING IN A TIME OF CLIMATE CHANGE, at 15 (2015).
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solar energy investment and production or that leave the growing
industry dead in the water.
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOLAR TARIFFS AND INVESTMENT
Fool Me Once: 2012 Tariffs
On November 7, 2012, the ITC voted in favor of imposing tariffs on
Chinese PV imports. 43 The ITC found that "there is a causal nexus
between subject [Chinese] imports and the poor condition of the
domestic industry" and that such imports caused material injury to the
United States solar market.44 As a result, Chinese PV cell
manufacturers were forced to pay a tax up to 35 percent on exports to
the United States. 45 Gordon Brinser, president of the later bankrupt
SolarWorld America, praised the decision: "Chinese manufacturers,
with the enthusiastic support of the Chinese government, have
attempted to game the international trading system in order to gain a
virtual monopoly on solar cells and modules sales in the U.S. market." 46
Although the effects of the tariffs may not have lived up to the ITC's and
Brinser's expectations, 47 important lessons can be taken away from this
decision.
To understand how these tariffs came into place, it is helpful to
trace the history of China's involvement in the solar energy movement
and how they became such a dominant player in this market. China
joined the global solar energy movement in the 1990s when Germany
persuaded it to develop a PV manufacturing base to meet German
demand.48 At the time, Germany was pioneering solar power on a mass
scale, and it needed to partner with a manufacturing giant such as
43. See Eric Wesoff, Final ITC Decision on SolarWorld's China-US Solar Trade
Complaint, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 7, 2012), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles
/read/case-casm.
44. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, CRYSTALLINE SILICON PHOTOVOLTAIC CELLS AND
MODULES FROM CHINA 30 (2011).
45. See Wesoff, supra note 43.
46. Id.
47. See Megan Geuss, Chinese Solar Exports Fall in 2016 with Global Anti-Dumping
Measures, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 20, 2017, 7:12 PM) (statement of Zhang Sen, China's
secretary general of the solar division) ("[D]espite the tariffs and duties, solar equipment
from China is still prevalent throughout the world."), https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/20 17/02/chinese-solar-exports-fall-in-20 16-with-global-anti-dumping-
measures/.
48. See John Fialka, Why China is Dominating the Solar Industry, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-china-is-
dominating-the-solar-industry/.
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China. 49 According to Donald Chung, a solar energy researcher for the
U.S. Department of Energy, "[t]he Chinese took [solar energy] and
basically ran with it."50 It did not take long for Chinese manufacturers
of PV panels to recognize the profits that could be made from solar
expansion. China began to recruit some of the world's leading solar
experts and companies to move to China by promising generous tax
credits. 51 Over the next two decades, China's solar manufacturing
industry grew to dominate the global export market through cheap,
skilled labor thereby "fundamentally chang[ing] the economics of solar
all over the world." 52
By the early 2010s, the Chinese PV manufacturing industry had
slashed the global cost of solar energy by 80 percent and became the
main contributor to a worldwide PV surplus; "there were roughly two
panels being made for every one being ordered by an overseas
customer."53 After seeing the global market flooded with Chinese PV
panels, China shifted its focus inward by incentivizing the domestic
generation of solar energy, which increased demand and fueled the
manufacturing industry. 54 As China's domestic solar market quickly
grew, PV manufacturers elsewhere in the world began filing for
bankruptcy; 55 many pointed the finger at the Asian powerhouse for
driving prices below their bottom line. 56
The massive growth of China's solar manufacturing industry
culminated with the United States' announcement of tariffs on Chinese
PV imports. The announcement ignited widespread backlash by solar
energy advocates within the United States and abroad. Proponents of
free trade claimed that imposing these tariffs would significantly
increase the cost of PV generation and dry up global demand, both of
which would have dire effects on investment. 57 However, to the surprise
of many, a steady flow of Chinese PV panels continued to reach the
United States' market despite the tariffs. This was not because PV
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. See Eric Wesoff, Rest in Peace: The List of Deceased Solar Companies, GREENTECH
MEDIA (Apr. 6, 2013), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Rest-in-Peace-The-
List-of-Deceased-Solar-Companies.
56. See Jeffrey Ball, The Next Battle in Our Trade War with China, NEW REPUBLIC
(Jan. 21, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/116286/solar-panel-trade-war-china.
57. See Nick Stockton, Why the U.S. Solar Industry Doesn't Want Government
Protection, WIRED (Aug. 21, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/why-the-us-
solar-industry-doesnt-want-government-protection/.
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exporters chose to pay the added fees to continue shipping panels into
the United States but rather because the exporters found a loophole in
the tariff order. 58 The loophole allowed PV panels to be imported tariff-
free if they were built outside of China regardless of where they were
later assembled. 59 As a result, Chinese PV manufacturers outsourced
manufacturing jobs to other Asian nations-most notably Taiwan-and
shipped the manufactured materials back to China where they would be
assembled and exported to the United States at no extra cost.6 0
China also retaliated by imposing tariffs of its own on U.S. exports
of polysilicon, the main ingredient used in PV cells to generate energy.6 1
U.S. polysilicon manufacturers accounted for around 24 percent of the
global supply in 2012, much of which was sold to Chinese PV
manufacturers.6 2 The tariffs, set at 57 percent, effectively made it
impossible for U.S. polysilicon manufacturers to sell their products to
Chinese buyers.6 3 As a result, manufacturers were forced to halt plans
for expansion and, in some instances, shut down existing manufacturing
facilities. 6 4 The polysilicon tariffs still exist today.
While Chinese PV panels continued flowing into the United States
after the 2012 tariffs, investment in U.S. solar energy took a major
blow. Solar investment in the United States totaled $27.6 billion in
201165 but fell to $8.8 billion in 2012.66 The decline cannot be attributed
entirely to the tariffs,6 7 but surely the tariffs imposed by both nations
played a role in deteriorating market confidence that ultimately led to
over two-thirds of total investments being pulled from the market.
Simply, the tariffs did not amount to the positive effects on the domestic
58. See Ball, supra note 56.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Steven Mufson, Chinese Tariffs May Hurt U.S. Makers of Solar Cells' Raw
Material, WASH. POST (July 23, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy
/chinese-tariffs-may-hurt-us-makers-of- solar-cells-raw-material/2013/07/23/01 ac60a4-f3d9-
1 1e2-aa2e-4088616498b4_story.html.
62. See id.
63. See Willian Pentland, China Scores Big Win in Solar Trade Battle as REC Silicon
Shutters US Polysilicon Production, FORBES (Feb. 8, 2016, 8:50 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2016/02/08/china-scores-big-win-in-solar-
trade-battle-as-rec-silicon-shutters-us-polysilicon-production/#422c7efd269d.
64. See, e.g., Mark Osborne, REC Silicon Stopping all FBR Polysilicon Production at
Moses Lake Plant, PV-TECH (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.pv-tech.org/news/rec-silicon-
stopping-all-fbr-polysilicon-production-at-moses-lake-plant.
65. U.N. ENVT PROGRAMME & BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, GLOBAL TRENDS IN
RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 2012, at 25 (2012).
66. U.N. ENVT PROGRAMME & BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, GLOBAL TRENDS IN
RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 2013, at 24 (2013).
67. See id. (noting that expiration of federal tax and loan incentives played a role in the
investment decline).
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manufacturing sector that advocates had hoped. Arguably, the tariffs
did more harm than good by forcing many domestic polysilicon and PV
panel manufacturers to scale back rather than expand outward.
Fool Me Twice: 2014 Tariffs
After being outsmarted by the vast Asian PV manufacturing
industry, the United States proposed a second round of tariffs on
Chinese PV materials in December 2014.68 The primary goal of the new
tariffs was to close the loophole that had allowed China to entirely
sidestep the earlier tariffs by including PV materials manufactured in
Taiwan to the tariff import list.6 9
As in 2012, there was a clear dichotomy between those in favor of
tariffs and those opposed. SolarWorld America, albeit under the new
president, Mukesh Dulani, spoke in high praises of import taxes and
claimed that "[t]he tariffs ... set the stage for companies to create new
jobs and build or expand factories on U.S. soil." 70 On the other side, the
president of the Coalition for Affordable Solar Energy attested, "[t]hese
unnecessary taxes inhibit competition and put upward pressure on solar
panel prices needed by U.S. homeowners, installers and utilities." 71
Slate news even went so far as to describe the escalating conflict with
China as "[t]he world's dumbest trade war." 72
In an unsurprising repeat of the 2012 tariff aftermath, the U.S.
solar market lacked significant change following the implementation of
the 2014 tariffs. The cost of PV panels did not increase as tariff
advocates had hoped but rather continued to fall to record lows. 73
Similarly, there was not a drop in Asian PV imports. In fact, export
production of PV equipment from other Asian nations, such as
Malaysia, 74 Vietnam, and Thailand skyrocketed. 75 In 2016, the United
68. See Diane Cardwell, U.S. imposes Steep Tariffs on Chinese Solar Panels, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/business/energy-environment
/-us-imposes-steep-tariffs-on-chinese-solar-panels.html.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Will Oremus, The World's Dumbest Trade War, SLATE (Feb. 19, 2014, 10:13 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technoogy/technoogy/2014/2/us-china-solar-trade war so
larworld case is bad for-green-jobs.html
73. See Eric Wesoff & Stephen Lacey, Solar Costs are Hitting Jaw-Dropping Lows in
Every Region of the World, GREENTECH MEDIA (June 27, 2017), https://
www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/solar-costs-are-hitting-j aw-dropping-lows-in-every-
region-of-the-world.
74. See Keith Bradsher, Solar Rises in Malaysia During Trade Wars over Panels, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 11, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/12/business/energy-environment
/solar-rises-in-malaysia-during-trade-wars-over-panels.html.
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States imported $520 million in PV panels from Thailand and $514
million from Vietnam, both of which accounted for less than $1 million
in imports four years earlier.76 China had simply found another
loophole; since it could not export from its own soil any longer, it moved
manufacturing and assembly operations to other Asian nations that
could export PV panels freely. 77
Meanwhile, investment in the U.S. solar market has steadily
recovered from its significant decline after the first set of tariffs. In
2015, total investment in U.S. solar energy reached over $30 billion,
which surpassed 2011 totals. 78 The surge has largely been led by
investments through public markets, and many PV manufacturers have
been forced to raise capital through IPOs and secondary offerings to
remain afloat. 79 There has also been a swell in solar investment by U.S.
utility companies who wish to capitalize on the low costs of PV panels
and prepare for increased future demand.8 0 The 2014 tariffs did not
shock the market as the earlier tariffs did likely because investors have
relied on the assumption that Chinese PV manufacturers will continue
moving operations internationally. As long as China can move its
manufacturing across borders to avoid tariffs, PV costs can be expected
to remain low, and China can maintain installation demand.
Clearly, both attempts to suppress low-cost PV imports through
tariffs have resulted in an overwhelming failure. Today, PV costs are
lower than ever,8 1 and both the United States and China have suffered
countless bankruptcies among their domestic solar industries because of
the trade war between them.8 2 The U.S. solar market remains flooded
with foreign PV panels, and investment in the market has bounced back
to pre-tariff levels. However, given the new set of PV tariffs imposed by
President Trump in 2018, the question becomes whether costs of PV
75. See Finlay Colville, Thailand and Vietnam Become Lead Countries for OEM Solar
Module Supply, PV-TECH (Feb. 3, 2017, 11:15 AM), https://www.pv-tech.org/editors-
blog/thailand-and-vietnam-become-lead-countries-for-oem-solar-module-supply.
76. See Marc Gunther, Could a Trade Dispute with China Bring an End to U.S. Solar
Boom?, YALE ENVIRONMENT360 (June 27, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/features/could-
trade-dispute-with-china-bring-an-end-to-u-s-solar-boom.
77. See id.
78. See U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME & BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, supra note 11,
at 24.
79. U.N. ENVT PROGRAMME & BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, GLOBAL TRENDS IN
RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 2015, at 64 (2015).
80. Robert Ferris, US Solar Installations Nearly Doubled in 2016, and Broke some
Records, CNBC (Feb. 15, 2017, 10:51 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/14/us-solar-
installations-nearly-doubled-in-20 16-and-broke-some-records.html.
81. RAN FU ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEM
COST BENCHMARK: Qi 2017, at vi (2017).
82. See Wesoff, supra note 55.
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manufacturing can continue to fall-and whether investment in the
market can ever recover-under such isolationist trade policies.
WHY IMPOSING PV TARIFFS IS A BAD IDEA
While working in Seoul shortly after Suniva successfully petitioned
the ITC to initiate the Section 201 case on Asian PV imports, I attended
a seminar titled What to Expect from the U.S. Energy Market in 2017.
Hundreds of Korean investors filled a conference hall and listened to
experts from Bloomberg, Wells Fargo, Clifford Chance, and other
institutions discuss various aspects of the U.S. energy market. When
time was allotted for an audience response, I noticed a reoccurring
theme among questions being asked; several audience members were
curious about the effects of the recent news by the ITC regarding
Suniva. I could feel their distraught attitudes about what tariffs could
mean for their solar investments. They were scared and, although for
different reasons, I was scared too.
Adding Suniva to the Mix
When Suniva announced that it was filing for Chapter 11
bankruptcy in April 2017, there was little surprise among those who
had previously followed the U.S. solar energy markets. The
manufacturer had been announcing for weeks that it would be making
significant layoffs and that it was struggling to compete with low
production costs. 8 3 It was equally unsurprising when SolarWorld
America announced its insolvency just weeks later8 4 and joined forces
with Suniva to call for the very same remedy that proved ineffective
twice before: more tariffs.8 5 After all, SolarWorld had been the vocal
leader of the push for tariffs on PV imports in both 2012 and 2014.86
This time, however, they wanted to go a step further and impose tariffs
globally. Matthew McConkey, Suniva's attorney, stated, "Without global
relief, the domestic industry will be playing 'whack-a-mole' against ...
modules from particular countries." 87
Section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act had not been successfully invoked
83. See Heather Jordan, Suniva Reports 59 Layoffs to State of Michigan, MLIVE (Apr.
4, 2017), http://www.mlive.com/news/saginaw/index.ssf/2017/04/future of sunivas_
saginaw _coun.html.
84. See Jonathan Gifford, Breaking: SolarWorld Insolvent, PV MAGAZINE (May 10,
2017), https://www.pv-magazine.com/2017/05/10/breaking-solarworld-insolvent/.
85. See Ryan, supra note 15.
86. See Cardwell, supra note 68; see also Wesoff, supra note 43.
87. Gunther, supra note 77.
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since 2002 when the domestic steel industry persuaded the ITC and
President Bush to impose tariffs on certain steel imports.88 The nation
was as divided then on the issue of steel tariffs as it is now with solar
energy tariffs. However, the steel tariffs only existed for a year before
they were reversed by the president for failure to comply with
international law.89 Although the short-lived steel tariffs were declared
a victory by the Bush administration, steel production in the United
States fell nearly 7 percent during the life of the tariffs. 90 The
effectiveness of Section 201 in safeguarding and promoting domestic
industry has been questioned by many as empirical evidence has shown
that its positive effects are little to none when compared to its costs. 91
Although Suniva and SolarWorld America successfully persuaded
the ITC to recommend tariffs, the proposed tariffs by the four ITC
commissioners were less severe than the two manufacturers' proposals.
Both petitioned for tariffs of twenty-five cents per watt on PV cells and
thirty-two cents per watt on assembled PV panels. 92 However, the two
proposals differed in that Suniva sought a price floor on all imported
solar products, while SolarWorld America proposed a quota system that
would cap imports of both cells and panels. 93 Both manufacturers came
to the negotiating table with their strongest hand.
The four ITC commissioners concluded their investigation by
announcing three separate tariff proposals, all of which excluded certain
free-trade agreement partners. 94 The first proposal, agreed on by two
commissioners, would impose a four-year, one gigawatt quota cap on PV
products, with a tariff of 30 percent on PV products exceeding the quota.
The proposed quota would increase by 0.2 gigawatts annually, and the
tariff would decrease by 5 percent annually over the life of the
program. 95 The proposals set forth by the other two ITC commissioners
fell on opposite ends of the spectrum: one imposing a more severe quota
of 0.5 gigawatts and one with a much more import-friendly quota of 8.9
88. See Eliza Patterson, The US Provides Section 201 Relief for the American Steel
Industry, AM. SOCY OF INT'L LAW (Mar. 19, 2002), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/7
/issue/4/us-provides-section-20 1-relief- american-steel-industry.
89. See Dan Ackman, Bush Cuts Steel Tariffs, Declares Victory, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2003,
8:59 AM), https://www.forbes.com/2003/12/05/cx da 1205topnews.html#2 lcea ldf2ab 1.
90. See id.
91. See David Ryan, The Effects of Section 201 Safeguards on U.S. Industries, 44 GEO.
J. INT'L L. 249, 253 (2012).
92. Pyper, supra note 17.
93. See id.
94. See id. (excluding nations such as Australia, Israel, Singapore, and several Latin
American nations).
95. See id.
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gigawatts. 96 Ultimately, President Trump imposed a four-year tariff
schedule most similar to the ITC's first proposal.9 7 Under Trump's
program, the quota is set at 2.5 gigawatts, and the tariff will decrease
from 30 percent to 15 percent over the life of the program.98
Since Suniva and SolarWorld America invoked the Section 201
trade case, cries in opposition of tariffs once again echoed throughout
the U.S. solar market. The earlier tariffs proved to be bearable because
of their limited scope that only required Chinese manufacturers to jump
around from nation-to-nation in Southeast Asia, but global tariffs now
mean that the manufacturers are forced to operate within the United
States to competitively sell PV materials in the U.S. solar market.
Domestic PV costs have continued to fall despite the 2012 and 2014
tariffs, but surely this trend will not continue now that the United
States has effectively isolated itself from the global markets.
Can Global Tariffs Result in Positive Benefits?
Among the U.S. population, there is a clear contrast between those
in favor of PV tariffs as imposed by President Trump and those opposed.
Advocates cite domestic job growth in solar manufacturing and
incentives for product innovation through higher costs as positive
benefits that will result from imposing further tariffs. Although these
are valid considerations, adopting a free-market trade approach can
achieve both job growth and innovation while keeping solar costs low.
Job Growth?
Jobs are important, and in a competitive, globalized world, it is vital
to promote and support a domestic workforce. Rightfully, advocates of
PV tariffs are worried that all solar jobs will be lost overseas if costs are
not inflated to preserve the domestic solar industry. However, this
argument overlooks the fact that not all solar energy jobs are in
manufacturing. The United States is a very small player in global PV
manufacturing. Only about 1 percent of global PV cells and panels were
manufactured in the United States in 2015. 99
There is a plethora of jobs outside of manufacturing in the solar
industry, such as installation, maintenance, sales, and R&D. These are
best suited for a domestic workforce and increase as the solar market
96. See id.
97. See Cama, supra note 18.
98. Id.
99. JEFFREY BALL ET AL., STANFORD UNIV., STEYER-TAYLOR CTR. FOR ENERGY POLICY
AND FINANCE, THE NEW SOLAR SYSTEM 166 (2017).
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expands. Instead of focusing solely on manufacturing, the United States
should be creating utility "throughout the product lifecycle," thereby
"making value" as opposed to "making things." 100 This is underscored by
the fact that the 2012 and 2014 tariffs had little to no effect on U.S. PV
manufacturing but seriously affected the domestic polysilicon
manufacturing industry, which fell from about 25 percent in 2012 to
only 10.6 percent of the global supply in 2015. The escalating trade war
with China and other Asian PV manufacturers has proven costly, and
by digging a deeper hole with more tariffs, the United States is losing
sight of the possibilities that exist on the remainder of the product
lifecycle spectrum.
The United States cannot efficiently compete with its Asian
competitors in the manufacturing realm due to wage gaps, and even if
tariffs can level the competition, most manufacturing jobs will be filled
by robotics in the near future. Rather than focusing on the lost cause of
a prominent solar manufacturing industry, the United States should
focus on keeping PV costs low to promote job growth in other areas of
the solar lifecycle.
Innovation Incentives?
Among those in favor of tariffs on PV panels, a recurring phrase is
green mercantilism. According to the Information Technology &
Innovation Foundation green mercantilism is defined as:
[T]he adoption of policies that give countries an unfair
advantage to boost exports and limit imports of clean
energy technologies . . . a major departure from rules-
based clean technology trade. It's represented by
"beggar-thy-neighbor" policies, including lax IP
enforcement, forced technology transfer, export
subsidies, discriminatory standards, barriers to imports,
and preferential treatment of domestic firms by their
parent governments. 101
Tariff advocates claim that China stifled PV manufacturing and
innovation through green mercantilist policies. 102 Considering a small
100. NAT'L ACAD. OF ENG'G, MAKING VALUE FOR AMERICA 14 (Nicholas M. Donofrio &
Kate S. Whitefoot, eds. 2015).
101. MATTHEW STEPP & ROBERT D. ATKINSON, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND,
GREEN MERCANTILISM: THREAT TO THE CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY 1 (2012).
102. See August Rick, The U.S. and China's Battle over Solar May Actually Benefit the
Industry Worldwide, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
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number of manufacturers encompass a clear majority of Chinese PV
panel production, there are few incentives for them to innovate, 103 and
costs are too low to incentivize innovation elsewhere. However, the same
advocates fail to consider that the United States now plays just as great
of a role in green mercantilist policymaking by imposing tariffs as China
has in the past decade by flooding the global markets with its
manufactured PV panels.
Further, advocates complain about the Chinese government giving
subsidies to PV manufacturers, which allows them to operate at a lower
bottom line. Again, advocates fail to consider that the United States has
been doing the same thing for years, notably the state of Michigan,
which provides Suniva with favorable tax incentives to build its factory
in Saginaw. 104 The subsidies given by the federal and state governments
in the United States may not be as generous as those provided by the
Chinese government, but the fact remains that China and the United
States are not so different when it comes to solar policymaking.
This is not to say that green mercantilism does not have any
negative effects. Such protectionist policies significantly impact
innovation, which in turn impacts investment. 105 However, advocates of
PV tariffs may be misguided in their emphasis on innovation. While
innovation is important, it should be viewed as a result of a thriving
solar market rather than the means to achieve such a market.
Emphasis should instead be placed on keeping costs of solar energy as
low as efficiently possible. With low costs in place, the U.S. solar market
will have the ability to expand and thrive through increased demand,
which will produce more jobs in non-manufacturing roles. As the
domestic market expands, innovation will follow by way of increased
market capital.
Using Economics to Challenge Tariff Theory
As I have shown, increasing costs of solar PV production through
tariffs will not galvanize the domestic solar manufacturing industry;
rather, it will restrain the growth of the solar markets. By looking at the
situation through an economic lens, the law of demand states that as
prices fall, demand increases. Conversely, when prices rise, fewer
consumers will find it efficient to purchase any given product. If demand
in any market dries up, producers are forced to either cut costs and
augustrick/2018/01/18/why-a-solar-tariff-in-the-u-s-could-benefit-other-
countries/#371 la7815c6b.
103. See Gunther, supra note 77.
104. See id.
105. See STEPP & ATKINSON, supra note 101, at 3.
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scale down or exit the market. The reduced supply as a result will drive
prices up further. The solar market is not any different. If solar
production costs are increased by imposing tariffs on cheaper materials,
demand in the United States for solar energy will fall, and the domestic
market will shrink. In some markets, consolidation can be a good thing,
but the market for a public good such as solar energy should remain
diverse to keep prices low and demand high.
When market growth is restrained, so too is investment. One of the
foundational principles of economics is comparative advantage.
Comparative advantage posits that total output and consumption can be
increased through trade, such that "every country . . . would benefit
from specializing in what it was relatively best at producing and then
engaging in trade for everything else." 106 Clearly, China has a
comparative advantage over the United States in PV manufacturing, as
shown by China's ability to scale up manufacturing infrastructure and
dominate the global market in a relatively short period of time.
Likewise, the United States arguably has a comparative advantage over
China in solar R&D, as shown by the United States' track record in
delivering cutting-edge advancements in solar technology. 107 Rather
than economically isolating one's self through tariffs, the United States
and China could increase global investment in solar energy by
specializing in R&D and manufacturing, respectively, and trading freely
with the other.
To ensure economic gain and to maximize investment in the solar
market, the United States needs to "help maximize the industry's
efficient global growth."108 There is certainly a circular relationship
between production, market expansion, costs, and investment.
Investment leads to expansion in the market, which leads to increased
production and, eventually, to lower costs. Lower costs lead to greater
demand and greater investment to meet such demand. Each element
relies on the others. Tariffs, on the other hand, break the chain by
increasing costs, thereby impeding efficient global growth.
Instead of focusing on expanding an inefficient domestic PV
manufacturing industry, the United States should be opening itself up
for trade with the rest of the world to capitalize on the increasingly
globalized nature of the solar energy industry. Investments in the solar
market extend across national borders, often intertwining the markets
of two or more nations. Investments in Chinese PV manufacturing rely
on investments in U.S. R&D, and vice versa. Output expands at an
106. DAVID A. Moss, A CONCISE GUIDE TO MACROECONOMICS 16(2007).
107. See BALL ET AL., supra note 99, at 167-68 (explaining that the United States is
among the global leaders in solar R&D).
108. Id. at 162.
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efficient rate when nations specialize and cooperate with each other,
and investment benefits as a result. While it may be tempting to isolate
and promote domestic manufacturing, the costs associated with such a
strategy are far outweighed by the benefits of free trade.
CONCLUSION
Solar energy has made enormous strides in the past half-century,
but it faces significant hurdles-namely, the need for further
investment-if it is to assume a significant proportion of total energy
generated in the United States. The United States is at a turning point
in which it has chosen to isolate itself from global PV manufacturing
rather than embracing the fact that "making value" does not always
equate to "making things." Imposing tariffs on PV cells and panels has
been a losing battle for the United States over the past five years, and it
is time to recognize that expanding tariffs will lead to more harm than
gain. For investment to flourish, the United States needs to take a new
position going forward by placing an emphasis on cutting PV costs and
embracing the comparative advantages of its global competitors through
free-market policies. As prices fall, output will expand, and investment
will follow. The solar industry has accomplished more in the past fifty
years than was ever previously thought possible. There is no reason why
its incredible growth should stop now.
